In spite of sinking nine heavy cruisers and four Brooklyn-class light cruisers at the Battle of the Marshall Islands, the balance of cruiser forces between Japan and the United States had already tilted towards parity or even favoring the US within just over a year. This was due to the successive commissioning of cruisers planned before the war, such as the Atlanta and Cleveland class cruisers.
On the other hand, the Imperial Navy had not built a single cruiser after the construction of the Tone and Chikuma under the Circle 2 Plan, except for the exception of the Katori-class training cruiser. This was because the gunnery faction had been given free reign to build as many as seven large battleships under the Circle 3 and Circle 4 Plans, and the successor cruisers to the 5.500-ton light cruisers that the torpedo proponents wanted, and the reconnaissance command cruisers that the submarine proponents were eager to build, all failed to see the light of day. Furthermore, the long-awaited new regular aircraft carriers by the aviation proponents were also not constructed. From their perspective, the cruiser construction situation in the United States was enviable, but in reality, it was extremely challenging.
While cruisers like the Atlanta-class, which could serve as both anti-air and torpedo squadron flagship, and the Cleveland-class, which could handle anti-ship and anti-air combat seamlessly, were highly capable, their true potential could only be realized with skilled crews. Among the six light cruisers, two Brooklyn-class and four Cleveland-class, in Task Force 1, not a single ship was crewed entirely by seasoned soldiers.
While the two Brooklyn-class light cruisers were initially manned by seasoned personnel at the beginning of the war, many of them were poached for key roles in the newly built Atlanta-class or Cleveland-class cruisers, or transferred to educational units to train new recruits. On the other hand, the four Cleveland-class cruisers had transferred a large number of crew members from the aforementioned Brooklyn-class and the outdated Omaha-class light cruisers. However, they were far from being fully manned, and the remaining positions had to be filled with young or new recruits. As a result, the Omaha-class, which had lost a large number of experienced soldiers to the new cruisers, became a training cruiser-like presence involved in relatively safe tasks, such as patrols around the mainland.
However, both the Brooklyn and Cleveland class cruisers were newer than the heavy cruisers like the Takao and Myōkō classes they faced, with superior equipment such as fire control systems and emergency command equipment. On the other hand, the crew members of the Takao and Myōkō classes had accumulated more than enough combat experience from the beginning of the war in the Southern Operation to the Indian Ocean operations, making them accustomed to the battlefield in both positive and negative senses.
The battle between inexperienced new ships and seasoned old ships seemed to grind each other down, but what decided the outcome was the difference in experience and gun caliber. When a shell hits, not only do structures break but humans are also shattered. The soldiers of the Takao and Myōkō classes, to put it positively, were brave and somewhat numb to the deaths of their comrades, behaving in a way that was somewhat paralyzed in the face of combat. Their lack of unnecessary emotions allowed for swift movements. Upon being hit, they promptly and decisively identified the source of the most feared smoke – a shipboard fire. The ship's structure, equipment, and the best or second-best course of action were ingrained in their bodies, resulting in efficient movements.
On the other hand, among the inexperienced young soldiers and new recruits who fought on the Brooklyn and Cleveland classes, there were hardly any who were accustomed to the sight of their comrades' blood, flesh, bones, and internal organs being scattered. Therefore, it was not just one or two new recruits who couldn't maintain their sanity in the grim reality of combat. Many of those called veterans were either transfers from the Atlantic, where there were no formidable enemy fleets, or individuals who had been stationed in the rear. Some had no combat experience at all, making them unable to give immediate and appropriate orders. Despite having emergency command equipment superior to that of Japanese cruisers, American cruisers were clearly lagging behind in extinguishing fires. As a result, the American cruisers enveloped in smoke began to experience difficulties in firing. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Japanese cruisers did not miss a beat, showering them with 20 cm shells, which were twice as heavy as the 15,2 cm shells carried by the Brooklyn-class and Cleveland-class, accelerating the dance of flames and smoke.
On the other side, the Takao and Myōkō classes had also suffered damage, but the 15,2 cm shells, to some extent, were not fatal even if they hit. However, if the Takao and Myōkō classes had retained torpedo tubes and next-load mechanisms, as they did before the refitting, some of them might have suffered fatal blows due to detonations. Many ships hit by 15,2 cm shells were in locations where torpedo tubes and reloading mechanisms used to be.
Due to the gunnery faction's interference or harassment against the torpedo faction, all heavy cruisers except the Furutaka and Aoba classes had their torpedo armaments removed, and in a sense, this decision proved effective. However, in the heat of battle, no one had the opportunity to reflect on this.