David Hume: On the Inscrutable Nature of God
During the eighteenth century, the principles of reason and order prevailed as natural laws governing man and the universe. As a carryover from Newtonian physics, men viewed the world as a series of causes and effects, all working toward the universal good of mankind, as God designed the cosmos and looked down upon His creation. As spokesman for the Augustan Age, Alexander Pope's "Essay on Man" epitomized the literary trend of the period, most especially in its concluding quatrain which proceeded thus: "All discord, harmony not understood: All partial evil, universal good: And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, One truth is clear. WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT" (Pope 458). In contrast, English skeptic David Hume poses a contrary view regarding the Age of Enlightenment in which he expresses doubts and uncertainty concerning the Deistic tenets of reason and order, as well as the Christian doctrines of faith and grace. The following excerpt from Hume's Natural History of Religion reveals the author's skepticism:"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, [and] suspense of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning the subject. But such is frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld"(Hume 74).
To Hume, God was neither clock maker nor the divine healer, but rather, the unknowable and unattainable. Nonetheless, the existence of the Deity is never questioned but His attributes are, as the philosopher-historian proceeded to prove in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Like Newman and Carlyle, Hume clings unequivocally to his faith, yet rejected the Deistic notions of his time. Instead, he maintained that the limitations of any orthodox belief reduce the stature of both God and man because of His inscrutable power and mystery. His view, in essence, expressed an even greater faith in the omnipotence of God. Just as Carlyle proposes a new ethical clothing to replace the concept of social progress in his time, so does Newman suggests a new primitivism to supplant the dead traditions of his generation. In each case, the existing philosophical foundation must undergo an ideological transformation to challenge the consistency of the faith, even in the case of the Church, as Newman discovered. Ironically, institutions must undergo transformation, much like individuals. This process of growth or change is what Spengler discusses in his analogy of plant cycle to history, or civilizations. If these necessary changes fail to occur, however, those suffering societies can also undergo a form of neurosis , as do people; and if the society's struggle to regain prominence fails or is hindered, the process can equally manifests itself in patterns of national paranoia, aggression and hostility, as Frankl suggests in Man's Search for Meaning. Thus, growth, whether singular or collective, must be tempered by dignity, compassion, and equity for all. This is Russell's message in Why Men Fight, and what Schweitzer calls a "Reverence for Life." Here, Hume strongly adheres to his belief in God, yet questions his contemporaries' view on the attributes of the Supreme Being. As a result of his skepticism, critics labeled Hume an atheist, yet his religious convictions in no respect support such a claim. Renan's contemporaries equally accused him of atheism; however, his belief in God's ultimate glory and heavenly triumph overwhelmingly corroborates his faith in the greatest of all miracles i.e. man's spiritual transformation. Even Schweitzer turned to the forms and practices of the First Church, casting aside the traditional ceremonies of his time.
In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume realizes the danger of publishing material so ostensibly unorthodox at the time, and therefore, structures his ideas in the form of a conversation between three individuals—Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo. As Hume illustrates through Pamphilus in the Dialogue's introduction, "Any question of philosophy . . . which is so obscure and uncertain that human reason can reach a fixed determination with regard to it, if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation"(Hume 504). Thus, the inadequacy of reason to resolve man's basic questions is explicit, as Hume points out in the selection. The author's disclaimer ironically refers to his readers as "reasonable men" who "may be allotted to differ where no one can reasonably be positive" and who can "afford an agreeable amusement . . . at opposite sentiments even without any decision" (Hume 504). In essence, Hume's flattering appeal is one of deliberate derision. Through the use of a persona, Hume presents both his personal views and the views of Christian and Deist, as they discuss the theological issue much in the same way that eighteenth-century gentlemen would debate an issue. Thus, by imitating the dialogues of Plato and Cicero, Hume airs his own opinions without fear of persecution or reprisal, however, conflict exists over whether Phil or Cleanthes actually represents Hume's position. Nevertheless, such a deliberate vagueness regarding the character roles reinforces the author's theme of ambiguity and uncertainty.
Rationalist Cleanthes defends creation by design, which parallels the Deistic perspective. According to Cleanthes,The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation (Hume 585).He next suggests order from reason rather than chance.And if the argument for theism be, as you pretend, contradictory to the principles of logic, its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention (Hume 529).
Cleanthes' view, as critic Norman Kemp Smith contends, represents the most commonly revered theological position of Hume's day (Smith 44). Thus, the author's purpose in questioning the argument by design, to his contemporaries, undermined the basic principles of the faith and incited his condemnation as a heretic.Both rationalist and Christian view Hume's attitude as rebellion against God. To Demea, who represents orthodox Christianity, Hume's doubts appear as faithlessness instead of humility before an all-wise, all-merciful God before whom believers "ought to humble [themselves] in his august presence . . . and . . . adore in silence his infinite perfections" (Hume 515). Demea proclaims that it "is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities, and next to the impiety of denying his existence is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees, and attributes (Hume 515-516).In his defense, the author replies through Pamphilus by saying,"What truth so obvious, so certain as the being of God? . . . which is the ground of all our hopes . . . foundation of morality . . . support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations?" (Hume 504).
Furthermore, Demea states that "the question is not the being but the nature of God" to which Philo responds that "the question can never be the being but only be the nature of the Deity" (Hume 515). Hume then concludes the dialogue by saying that questions concerning the nature of God have always sparked the disputes of men because man cannot ascertain absolute truth, only experience. His main contention is not the existence of God, but of his characteristics, which are indefinable in human terms (Hume 504). Thus, the author counters the eighteenth-century notion that reason, and not experience, governs the universe, as did Voltaire in Candide. For Hume, reason serves as a tool of the senses, from which man perceives the only accessible form of truth. In essence, the feelings of the heart supersede the ideas of the mind, which merely arranges those impressions in a logical fashion. From this juncture, the author draws four conclusions: (1) man's sentiments differ from God's (2) man's ideas derive from the sense, and therefore differ from God's, (3) none of man's materials of thought or understanding parallel the Supreme Being's, and (4) man's manner of thought differs from the God's, since human thoughts are fleeting and God's are constant (Hume 530-531). Even more poignant is the argument that man can never know or understand God because human morality fails to constitute a just criterion for one's judgment of Him. As Cleanthes remarks, "For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain" (Hume 568).
Finally, Hume progresses from the mystery of divine motivation to the existence of evil in the world. Since the Supreme Being cannot be evaluated by human moral standards, Hume addresses the greatest theological paradox facing thinkers and philosophers alike: 1) that evil can derive from good, or vice-versa, and 2) that absolute justice and benevolence can equally co-exist (570). The only solution to these paradoxes rests with God alone, and not within the realm of human understanding. Hume's acceptance of this reality constitutes his faith. According to Philo,"Why is there misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely . . . Is it from the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidarity of this reasoning . . . except we assert that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our . . . measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them" (Hume 570).
For Hume, truth cannot be found in the dry bones of formalism or the irrelevance of orthodoxy, a conclusion reached a generation later by Carlyle, Schweitzer, and Newman. Hume criticizes the theological inconsistencies of Demea's argument and explains how formalism acts merely as a comfort or crutch to the miserable instead of providing an earthly joy and hope (Hume 570). Similarly, the author ridicules orthodoxy by speaking through Philo, who views intervention as simply superstition, both scientifically untenable and unverifiable. Consequently, Demea leaves her companions and the discussion, a departure which symbolizes the inability of orthodox faith to resolve the issues of his time (Hume 582), and an optimism which Hume foresees through philosophy and skepticism, approaches which allow for change and order. Ironically, the two concepts appear antithetical, yet one underlies the other. Just as Spengler suggest growth and change as vital components survival, so does Hume. Supporting this principle of growth and change is what both Philo and Cleanthes recognize as a divine plan of order, harmony, and beauty (Hume 571). With man, the mind serves as the unifying component, although its source does not derive from reason, as in the view of his contemporaries. For Hume, this organizing source is the process of change, or change itself. Like Spengler two centuries later, Hume compares the earth to a vegetating plant that undergoes phases or stages of growth. He suggests that even in a state of flux, recurring cycles conserve the planet's form and matter. Change, to Hume, corresponds to Heraclitus' theory of life as motion or flux. According to Hume,"And does not a plant or an animal, which springs from vegetations or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world than does any artificial machine, which arises from reason and design?" (Hume 549).Ironically, Philo suggests words such as reason and generation only denote certain potential powers and energies in nature, yet their essence remains incomprehensible to man. In other words, man has yet to recognize that part of the personality that organizes and directs his behavior. Just as he cannot understand the nature of God, neither can he understand those divine attributes working within him.
In retrospect, philosopher David Humes proves a skeptic in the sense that he doubts man's ability to discern the absolute nature of God, a theist in that he acknowledges the existence of Deity, and in a sense, a product of his own century in that he recognizes an underlying principle governing a seemingly chaotic world. Hume's contemporaries fail to realize that within the author's skepticism is this underlying order of change. According to Hume, "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author, and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief for a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion (Abbott 142). His creed, as critic Wilbur Abbott suggests, would meet with acceptance in practically any orthodox church today (Abbott 142). In his insight, honesty and integrity, Hume proved to be ahead of his time, and today is regarded as "one of the most original and . . . influential of modern philosophers" (Turberville 108).
Works Cited for David Hume: On the Inscrutable Nature of God
Abbott, Wilbur C. Adventures in Reputation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Norman Kemp Smith, editor. 2nd ed. New York: Social Sciences Publishers, 1948.
Morrisroe, Michael J. "Hume's Rhetorical Strategy: A Solution to the Riddle of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion." Texas Studies in Literature. XI (Summer 1969): 963-974.
Philosophy of David Hume. V. C. Chappell, editor. New York: Modern Library, 1963.
Readings in Western Civilization. George Knowles, Rixford Snyder, editors. 4th ed. Vol. II. Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1968.
Turberville, A. S. English Men and Manners in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.