chien tranh tien te (ban tieng anh)

d. The Importance of Chinese Devaluation ............................................................ 9

(i) China vs. Greater China data...................................................................... 10

(ii) Export and Import data............................................................................... 11

(iii) The counter-factual ................................................................................... 12

e. Summarizing the Macro Evidence.................................................................... 13

f. The Micro Evidence ......................................................................................... 13

g. Did Devaluation Hurt Chinese Imports (and Asian Exports) ?.......................... 14

h. Political Economy of Trade Surpluses ............................................................. 14

i. Mercantilism defined ........................................................................................ 14

j. Mercantilism Index says YES ........................................................................... 15

k. Why Can't All Countries be Mercantilist ? ...................................................... 15

3. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSES..................................... 15

a. Did Japan Devaluation Cause the Crisis ? ........................................................ 15

b. Did Capital Account Liberalization cause the problem ? .................................. 16

c. Is Capital Account Liberalization not good for LDCs ? .................................... 17

d. Crony Capitalism and Non-Performing Assets of Banks .................................. 18

e. Equity and Property Markets............................................................................ 19

f. The perverse role of fiscal surpluses ................................................................. 19

4. WHAT DID HAPPEN ? ...................................................................................... 20

a. Capital flows and fixed exchange rates............................................................. 20

b. Zero hedging costs........................................................................................... 20

c. Floating exchange rates would have avoided the crisis ..................................... 21

d. Efficient Excess Capacity Creation .................................................................. 21

e. How to Compete? ............................................................................................ 21

f. Response of East Asia ...................................................................................... 21

g. Plaza is the parallel .......................................................................................... 21

5. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 22

References .................................................................................................................... 37